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There is accumulating neural evidence to support the
existence of two distinct systems for guiding action
selection, a deliberative ‘‘model-based’’ and a re-
flexive ‘‘model-free’’ system. However, little is known
about how the brain determines which of these
systems controls behavior at one moment in time.
We provide evidence for an arbitration mechanism
that allocates the degree of control over behavior
by model-based and model-free systems as a func-
tion of the reliability of their respective predictions.
We show that the inferior lateral prefrontal and fron-
topolar cortex encode both reliability signals and
the output of a comparison between those signals,
implicating these regions in the arbitration process.
Moreover, connectivity between these regions and
model-free valuation areas is negatively modulated
by the degree of model-based control in the arbi-
trator, suggesting that arbitration may work through
modulation of the model-free valuation system
when the arbitrator deems that the model-based
system should drive behavior.
INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that there are multiple competing
systems for controlling behavior, a deliberative or ‘‘goal-
directed’’ system and a reflexive ‘‘habitual system’’ (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998). Distinct neural substrates have been iden-
tified for these systems, with regions of prefrontal and anterior
striatum implicated in goal-directed control and a region of
posterior lateral striatum involved in habitual control (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Graybiel,
2008; Tricomi et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al.,
2009; Yin et al., 2004, 2005).
However, the issue of how control passes from one system to
the other has received scant empirical attention. Addressing this
issue is crucial for explaining how unified behavior emerges
through the interaction of these different systems, as well asfor understanding why the balance between goal-directed and
habitual systems might sometimes break down in diseases
such as addiction or obsessive compulsive disorder. For
example, persistent drug-taking behavior might reflect failure
to suppress inappropriate drug-related stimulus-response
(S-R) habits in spite of the fact that such behavior ultimately leads
to highly adverse consequences (Everitt and Robbins, 2005).
To address how the arbitrator works, we deployed a computa-
tional framework in which goal-directed and habitual behavior
are expressed as different forms of reinforcement learning.
Goal-directed learning is described as model based, in which
the agent uses an internal model of the environment in order to
compute the value of actions online (Daw et al., 2005; Doya
et al., 2002), while habitual control is proposed to be model
free, in that ‘‘cached’’ values for actions are acquired on the
basis of trial and error experience without any explicit model of
the decision problembeing encoded (Daw et al., 2005). Empirical
evidence for this computational distinction has emerged in
recent years (Daw et al., 2011; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Wunderlich
et al., 2012). It has been hypothesized (Daw et al., 2005), but
never directly tested, that an arbitrator evaluates the perfor-
mance of each of these systems and sets the degree of control
that each system has over behavior according to the reliability
of those predictions. Here, we aimed to elucidate the neural
mechanisms of this arbitration process in the human brain.RESULTS
Computational Model of Arbitration
The arbitration model consists of three levels of computation—
model-based/model-free learning, reliability estimation, and
reliability competition. The first layer consists of model-based
and model-free learning, which generate the state prediction
error (SPE) and reward prediction error (RPE), respectively. The
second layer provides an estimation of reliability for the two
learning models. Specifically, we start with a standard Bayesian
framework that formally dictates prior successes and failures in
predicting task contingencies in the form of prediction error
(PE). The next layer provides a competition between the two
reliabilities. This bottom-up design allows us to systematically
test six types of arbitration strategies (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures, available online, for details).Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 687
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free LearningWhen building the arbitrator, we leveraged the fact that
learning in these two systems is suggested to be mediated by
means of PE signals that indicate discrepancies between ex-
pected and actual outcomes. Whereas the model-free system
uses an RPE that reports the difference between actual and
expected reward (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997),
the model-based system uses an SPE to learn and update the
model of the world—in particular, to acquire state-action-state
transition probabilities (Gla¨scher et al., 2010). Our arbitrator
made inferences about the degree of reliability of the model-
based and the model-free systems by determining the extent
to which the SPE signals and RPE signals are estimated to be
high or low. If the SPE is close to zero, this means that the
model-based system has a good and reliable estimate of the
world, whereas if the SPE is high, this means that the model-
based system has a very inaccurate, and hence unreliable,
model of the world. Similarly, if RPEs are minimal, this means
that the model-free system likely has a very accurate estimate
of the expected reward available for different actions at that
moment in time, while high RPEs implie that the model-free sys-
tem has inaccurate, and hence unreliable, predictions about
future reward. To make these reliability inferences for the
model-based system, we formulated a bottom-up Bayesian
model that estimates the probability that the SPE is set to zero
at a particular moment in time. The reliability of the model-based
(RelMB) is defined as the ratio of the mean prediction and the
uncertainty of that prediction for SPE, a variance-to-mean ratio
that is formally known as an inverse of the index of dispersion
(Ma et al., 2006; Pennini and Plastino, 2010) (Figure S1A; see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for definitions). For the
model-free system, a similar Bayesian framework could also
be used, substituting the RPE for the SPE (dualBayesArbmodel;
see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). However, the
model-free system might not use sophisticated Bayesian
machinery to estimate reliability, but rather deploy a much
simpler mechanism for tracking the approximate degree of reli-
ability of the RPE (mixedArb model). A candidate mechanism
would be to use the absolute value of the RPE signal to learn
trial-by-trial predictions about the degree of reliability of the
RPE in a model-free manner (Li et al., 2011; Preuschoff et al.,
2008; Takahashi et al., 2011). Once the reliability signals are esti-
mated for the two systems, a dynamical two-state transition rule
borrowed from biophysics (see Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures) allows these two reliability indices to compete with
each other in order to set a weight (model-choice probability
PMB) that governs the extent to which the model-based versus
model-free systems control behavior. When PMB is high, control
is dominated by the model-based system, whereas when PMB is
low, control is dominated by the model-free system. Thus, con-
trol by the model-based versus model-free systems over
behavior is not implemented in an all or nothing fashion, but
rather the level of control each system exerts is dynamically
weighted by the degree of reliability in each system (Fig-
ure S1B). Also, due to the computational demands of having
to hold a model in memory, and operate on the model to dynam-
ically compute values, model-based control is likely to be more
cognitively effortful than model free. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that at least part of the consideration should include a688 Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.trade-off about cognitive complexity. The transition rule incor-
porates a bias term accommodating the fact that habits
involve less cognitive effort than goal-directed behavior and
thus should be favored, assuming all else is equal. Simulations
showed that this control framework could successfully
capture behavioral characteristics of goal-directed and habitual
learning in the literature, such as early devaluation-sensitive
control of behavior by the model-based system followed
by a gradual transition to devaluation-insensitive model-free
control with repeated training (Adams and Dickinson, 1981)
(Figure S1C).
Markov Decision Task: Goal and State-Transition
Uncertainty
Motivated by our proposed control scheme, we designed a
decision task in which, on different trials, the structure of the
task should optimally favor behavioral control by either the
model-based or model-free systems (Figures 1 and S2A). On
each trial, the participant makes sequential binary choices
through a two-layer Markov decision problem (MDP) in order
to obtain different colored tokens that are redeemable for
money (Figure 1A). The experiment consists of two main trial
types—specific and flexible goal (Figure 1B). On specific-goal
trials, the participant is informed at the outset that only one
color of token is redeemable on that trial (e.g., blue tokens
can be redeemed for money, but the other color tokens have
no value). The color of the tokens redeemable is switched on
a trial-by-trial basis (Figure 1C). On flexible-goal trials, by
contrast, the participant can collect any color token in order
to obtain monetary reward. Specific-goal trials should
encourage a more model-based strategy, because RPEs will
be, on average, high due to constant changes in goal state
values, while flexible-goal trials should enable gradual transition
to the model-free control scheme. In addition to this goal
manipulation, we also manipulated state-action-state transition
probabilities within the MDP so that on some occasions uncer-
tainty in state-action-state transitions is high (0.5 versus 0.5)
and on other occasions uncertainty in state-action-state transi-
tions is low (0.9 versus 0.1). Such differences in the state-
action-state transition probabilities across trials are designed
to elicit either high or low SPEs on average, which should favor
model-free versus model-based control, respectively (Fig-
ure S2B). This was reflected in our reliability estimation (Figures
2 and S3), which essentially leads the arbitration model to suc-
cessfully adapt to the changing environment. Twenty-two adult
participants (six females, age between 19 and 40) performed
the task while being scanned with fMRI.
Behavioral Results
Subjects performed the task successfully in all conditions (Fig-
ure 3A). To test whether uncertainty had an influence on a sub-
ject’s outcome experience while performing the task, we ran a
generalized linear model regression analysis on hit rate (Fig-
ure 3A), for which the distribution function was chosen to be
the Bernoulli, and the link function was the probit model. There
is a main effect of the goal and the uncertainty condition
(the coefficient estimate of the goal and the uncertainty
conditions were 0.8738 [p = 1.5 3 1016] and 0.6355
Figure 2. Computational Hypothesis to Account for Arbitration
between Model-Based and Model-free Learning Strategies
The Bayesian model computes reliability using the SPE used to update state-
action values of the model-based learning system, and a Pearce-Hall-type
associability model computes reliability using the RPE used for the update of
the state-action value of the model-free learning system. The computed
reliability functions as a transition rate for the two-state transition model, in
which each state represents the probability of choosing the model-based
learning strategy (PMB) and the model-free (1PMB), respectively. The state-
action value regulating the actual choice behavior is given by the weighted
average of values from the two reinforcement learning systems. See also
Figure S1 and Table S1.
Figure 1. Task Design
(A) Sequential two-choice Markov decision task. Participants move from one
state to the other with a certain state-transition probability p following a binary
choice (left or right).
(B) Illustration of the specific-goal condition, in which the color of the collecting
box (either yellow, blue, or red) should match the color of the coin and the
flexible condition, in which participants are allowed to collect any kind of coin.
The high uncertainty condition corresponds to p = (0.5, 0.5), and the low
uncertainty condition corresponds to p = (0.9, 0.1).
(C) Illustration of the task. The specific-goal block requires participants to rely
on a model-based strategy for guiding choices in each state, while, in the
flexible-goal block, an initial model-based strategy during early experience
can give way to a model-free strategy after extensive experience. See also
Figure S2.
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learning[p = 4.1 3 1011], respectively). The effect of state-transition
uncertainty is greater in the specific condition than in the
flexible condition (coefficient estimate of the interaction
equaled 0.16; p = 1 3 102). This suggests that the state-
transition uncertainty does considerably affect subjects’ perfor-
mance differently for each goal condition. It is also consistent
with our prediction that the model-based system, which tendsto gain control in the specific-goal condition, is more sensitive
to state uncertainty than the model free.
Model Comparison of Arbitration Process
We tested six different versions of our arbitration process to
establish which version of reliability computation best explains
the behavioral data (see Model-Comparison in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for details). We found that the ver-
sions of the arbitrator with a dynamical threshold, accommo-
dating the fact that behavior tends to move from model-based
to model-free control over time due to the increased cognitive
effort associated with model-based control, performed signifi-
cantly better than versions without the threshold (Table S1).
We also compared a version of the arbitrator in which the
model-free reliability was estimated using a full Bayesian
mechanism or else via the alternate absolute RPE approxi-
mation described above. The arbitrator in which the level of
control each system exerts is dynamically weighted by the
degree of reliability in each system and the absolute RPE
estimate is implemented on the model-free side (mixedArb-
dynamic model, although the model-based arbitrator was still
the full Bayesian version; refer to Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for full details) performed better than the full
Bayesian mechanism on the model-free side (dualBayesArb-
dynamic model) in terms of the trade-off between model fit
and model complexity (Wilcoxon signed-rank test on BIC
score data; p < 0.05; Table S1) and also better than the other
alternative arbitration strategies, including the original arbitra-
tion scheme proposed by Daw et al. (2005) (UncBayesArb)
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test on BIC score data; p < 0.01). We
therefore feature the best version of the arbitrator (mixedArb-
dynamic model; Table S2) as the primary model used in this
study, although the next-best model (dualBayesArb-dynamicNeuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 689
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Figure 3. Behavioral Results
(A) Performance of the subjects in the form of the mean
total reward accrued, the reward rate, and
the proportion of optimal choices. The left bar graph
shows the average reward received on each trial,
averaged over all subjects. Themiddle bar graph shows
the reward rate, the proportion of trials the rewarding
goal is reached. The right bar graph shows the optimal
choices, defined by the ideal agent’s behavior in each
condition (Figure S2A). The bold line in the bars refers to
the baseline given by the random agent making
choices. The green color code corresponds to the low
state-transition uncertainty condition, and the yellow
corresponds to the high uncertainty condition. Error
bars equal SEM across subjects.
(B) Performance of the arbitrator in capturing variation in
subjects’ choice behavior, demonstrating that the
model is performingwell in predicting subjects’ choices.
The model-predicted probability of choosing the right
action has been split into five equal-sized bins. The
proportion of subjects’ right choices increases with the
model’s action probability. Error bars are SEM.
(C) Performance of the arbitrator in capturing variation
in model-based and model-free choice strategies on
the consistency of participants’ choice behavior on a
trial-by-trial basis plotted separately for situations
where the arbitrator favors model-based control (PMB >
0.5), compared to when the arbitrator favors model-free
control (PMB < 0.5). The choice consistency is the pro-
portion of changes of choices from trial to trial in each
state. Choice consistency is significantly higher when
the arbitrator predicts predominantly model-free con-
trol, compared to when it predicts predominantly
model-based control. On the other hand, simply plot-
ting the choice consistency as a function of the
experimental conditions, specific versus flexible goal, is
not sufficient to reveal robust differences on this
behavioral measure. Results are plotted separately for
two different states in the task (states 1 and 4 equal the
state at layer 1 and 2 of the task, respectively. States 2,
3, and 5 are rarely sampled by participants, because
they lead to relatively low-valued outcomes and hence
are not plotted here, as there are insufficient samples to
enable meaningful performance plots to be extracted.
Error bars are SEM.
(D) Results from a log likelihood test comparing the
degree to which model-based versus model-free
reinforcement learning accounts best for participants’
choices, plotted separately for the (Di) situations in
which model-based control (PMB > 0.5) and (Dii) situ-
ations in which the arbitrator favors model-free control
(PMB < 0.5). The model based and the model free were
fitted independently to prevent circularity. Test statistics of likelihood-ratio test refer to log likelihood value of the model based minus the model free. The more
negative the ratio, the more the model-free system accounts better for behavior, while the more positive the ratio the more the model-based system accounts
better for behavior. As can be seen, in the strategic-goal condition the ratio test favors the model-free system (significant at p < 1 3 104), while in the flexible-
goal condition the ratio test favors the model-based system (significant at p < 1 3 1011).These findings thereby validate the task manipulations by showing
that the task can successfully manipulate control to be governed predominantly by either the model-based or model-free system. Error bars are SEM.
See also Table S2.
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learningmodel) and the original arbitrator form proposed by Daw et al.
(2005) are used in a formal model comparison of the fMRI data
below (see also Figures S4A and S4B for fMRI analyses with
mixedArb-dynamic model and dualBayesArb-dynamic model,
respectively, and Figure S4C for the comparison of the
model-choice probability between the two models).690 Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.Relationship between Arbitration Model and Choice
Behavior
To demonstrate that the arbitrator captures variation in
subjects’ choice behavior, we computed the proportion of times
subjects took the right action (as opposed to the left action) and
plotted this against the model-predicted probability of choosing
Neuron
Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learningthe right action (binned into each size bins) (Figure 3B). As can be
seen from the figure, the model does very well in predicting par-
ticipant’s choice behavior.
To further examine whether our control framework predicts
participants’ choice behavior, we compared the choice consis-
tency of the subjects in chunks of trials in which model-based
control is predicted by the arbitrator against other trials in which
model-free control is predicted. The choice consistency quan-
tifies the behavioral sensitivity exhibited to task structure
changes. If the model-based learning strategy is preferred,
then we would expect participants to exhibit a flexible profile of
choice behavior due to the fact that knowledge about state-tran-
sition probabilities facilitates rapid sensitivity to the changes of
the environment. If the model-free learning strategy is preferred,
thenwewould expect otherwise. The analysis indicates that sub-
jects’ choice consistency is well accounted for by our control
framework (Figure 3C). The more the arbitrator favors the
model-based learning strategy, the less consistent participants’
choices become. To provide a statistical measure of the model-
based influence on choice, we used a likelihood-ratio test
(Figure 3D) in which we separately fit the model-based and
model-free algorithms to behavior and computed the ratio be-
tween the likelihoods for the two models. This analysis revealed
that choice behavior is better explained by the model-based
learner when the arbitrator predicts that behavior should be
under model-based control, while the choice behavior is better
explained by the model-free learner when the arbitrator predicts
that behavior should be predominantly undermodel-free control.
Neural Correlates of Arbitration
To address the neural computations underlying control between
the model-based and model-free strategies, we regressed each
of our computational signals against the fMRI data (Figure S4A;
Table S3). To validate our approach, we initially attempted to
replicate previous findings indicating differential neural encoding
of SPE and RPE. Consistent with previous results, we found SPE
signals in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and intraparietal
sulcus (all p < 0.05 family-wise error [FWE] corrected), as well as
in anterior insula, while RPE signals were found in the ventral
striatum (p < 0.05 FWE) (Gla¨scher et al., 2010; McClure et al.,
2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003). We then tested for the computa-
tional signals needed to generate reliability estimates for the
two systems. The uncertainty of zero SPE, which is used as
an input for computing model-based reliability, was negatively
correlated with activity in multiple brain areas—dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), parts of supplementary motor area,
inferior parietal lobule, and thalamus (all p < 0.05 FWE
corrected; Table S3). The estimate of absolute RPE used by
the model-free system to generate a reliability estimate was
found in a region of caudate nucleus (p < 0.05 cluster-level
corrected; Table S3).
Next, we investigated neural correlates for the reliability sig-
nals. A region of inferior lateral prefrontal cortex (ilPFC) bilaterally
was found to correlate with the reliability of both the model-
based and the model-free systems (peak z scores were 5.18,
and 4.45, respectively), although activity in these areas corre-
lated best with the reliability of whichever system had the
maximum reliability (max(RelMB,RelMF; peak z score: 5.68; p <0.05 FWE; Figure 4), alongside a region of right frontopolar
cortex (FPC) (p < 0.05 cluster-level corrected; Figure 4). The neu-
ral activities in these areas are significantly better explained by
the reliability signals of our arbitration model (mixedArb-dynamic
model) than the alternative hypotheses, such as the version
implementing Bayesian estimation of reliability for both model
based and model free (dualBayesArb-dynamic model), which
showed the second-best model goodness and the Bayesian
value uncertainty arbitration (UncBayesArb; Daw et al., 2005)
(Figure 5; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for further
details).
A region of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was also found to
respond to the difference in the reliability between the two
systems (RelMB-RelMF) (p < 0.05 cluster-level corrected; Fig-
ure 4). These findings suggest that ACC may be involved in
comparing reliabilities, therefore forming an input into the arbi-
tration process, while the presence in the ilPFC and FPC of the
‘‘max’’ of the two reliabilities suggests that these regions may
be involved in implementing the arbitration process itself.
Neural Correlates ofModel-Based andModel-free Value
Signals
Next, we tested for areas correlating with value signals
computed by the two models. Shown in Figure 6 are the regions
whose variance in neural activation is purely explained by QMB
and QMF, respectively (Table S4). The chosen value of the
model-based (QMB), but not the model-free, system is associ-
ated with activity in orbital and medial prefrontal cortex (omPFC)
and parts of ACC (p < 0.05, small-volume corrected; Table S4).
The chosen value of the model-free (QMF), but not the model-
based, system is associated with activity in supplementary
motor area (SMA) (p < 0.05 FWE corrected; Table S4), dmPFC,
and dlPFC (p < 0.05 cluster-level corrected; Table S4), signifi-
cantly overlapping with value representation in right dlPFC and
dmPFC (Hare et al., 2011; Rowe et al., 2010), and most notably
in posterior putamen (significant at p < 0.05, small-volume cor-
rected; Table S4), a region that has been implicated in habitual
control and in model-free valuation in previous studies (Tricomi
et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2012). We also tested for regions
commonly activated by either model-free or model-based value
signals, revealing significant correlations in SMA and dmPFC
(p < 0.05 FWE and cluster-level corrected, respectively; Table
S4). In order to guide behavior, the brain ultimately needs to
compute an integrated value signal in which model-based and
model-free value signals are combined in a weighted manner
determined by the output of the arbitrator (i.e., by PMB).We found
significant correlations in ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) with such a weighted signal, corresponding to the dif-
ference in weighted values between the chosen and unchosen
actions (Boorman et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009; Rushworth
et al., 2011) (p < 0.05, FWE corrected; Table S4).
Neural Correlates of Value Integration
Our main finding is that a region of ilPFC, as well as right FPC,
contains reliability signals that could be used to implement an
arbitration between model-based and model-free control. How-
ever, in order to understand how the arbitration process might
work, we next needed to characterize the nature of theNeuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 691
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Figure 4. Neural Correlates of Reliability-Based Arbitration
(A) (Top) Bilateral ilPFC encodes reliability signals for the model-based (RelMB) and the model-free (RelMF) systems individually. The two reliabilities are, by and
large, not highly correlated (mean:0.26; SD: 0.106), suggesting that our task successfully dissociates themodel based from themodel free. Effects significant at
p < 0.05 (FWE corrected) are shown in yellow. (Bottom) A region of rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) was found to encode the difference in reliability between
the model-based and model-free systems (RelMB  RelMF), while an area of bilateral ilPFC and right FPC was correlated with the reliability of whichever system
had the highest reliability index on each trial (max(RelMB, RelMF)).
(B) The mean percent signal change for a parametric modulator encoding a max and difference reliability signal in lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and rACC. The
signal has been split into two equal-sized bins according to the 50th and 100th percentile. The error bars are SEMacross subjects. See also Figure S3 and Table S3.
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learninginteractions between the areas involved in encoding reliability
and areas involved in encoding valuation within the model-free
and model-based systems. To test for this, we implemented
PPI analyses, in which the physiological variable consisted of ac-
tivity in left or right ilPFC or FPC, and the psychological variable
was the output of the dynamic transition model, PMB (Figure 7A;
Table S5). Remarkably, we found a significant negative coupling
between ilPFC and regions of the left posterior andmid putamen,
including the area of posterior putamen found to encode model-
free valuation signals as well as in regions of supplementary mo-
tor cortex (p < 0.05 small-volume and cluster-level corrected,
respectively; see Figure S5A for a clear demonstration of the
overlap between the results of the PPI and areas found to be
active in model-free valuation). A negative coupling between
FPC and right posterior putamen was also found (small-volume
corrected; Table S5). We also looked for areas showing the
opposite coupling (i.e., showing increased coupling when PMB
is high, when behavior should be under model-based control).
We did not find any significant effects in this case, suggesting
that the arbitrator may work predominantly by acting on the
model-free system, as opposed to acting directly on the
model-based system. Second, we investigated modulation
effects among the value areas by PMB (Figure 7B; Table S5).
We found a strong negative modulation of the coupling between
posterior putamen and vmPFC by PMB, (p < 0.05 FWE), which692 Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.strongly supports the hypothesis that model-free value signals
are transmitted to vmPFC in order to be combined with model-
based values as a precursor to generating choices (see Fig-
ure S5B for evidence that areas found in vmPFC in the PPI are
specific to the integrated value area). Further, the strength of
these connections appears to be modulated by the arbitrator.
Effect of Reaction Time
We also tested for reaction time (RT) effects on behavior. When
we compare RTs on ‘‘specific-goal trials’’ to those in ‘‘flexible-
goal trials,’’ there is indeed an effect of condition on RTs such
that participants are slower on specific trials (where they have
to select a particular goal based on which token is currently
valuable) compared to when they do not (RT specific = 0.93 s;
RT flexible = 0.81 s; paired t test; t = 5.56; p = 1.61 3 105).
Furthermore, when we correlate the probability that behavior
is under model-based control (PMB) against RT, we also find a
modest, albeit significant, correlation in the majority of partici-
pants (median correlation coefficient = 0.13; correlation coeffi-
cient test; p < 1 3 102 for 16 out of 22 participants). This likely
reflects the possibility that model-based control is more effortful
cognitively than model-free control.
On account of these RT effects in the behavioral data, an
obvious concern is that RT effects could be confounded with
some of the computational variables in our fMRI analysis. In
Figure 5. Results of a Model Comparison Process on BOLD Corre-
lates of the Arbitration Process
For this, we implemented a Bayesian model selection analysis, and illustrate
voxels for which the exceedance probability is 0.9 in favor of a given model.
UncBayesArb refers to the uncertainty-based arbitration used by Daw et al.
(2005), dualBayesArb refers to the dualBayesArb-dynamic model, and
mixedArb refers to themixedArb-dynamicmodel. The colored blobs and table
show the voxels and the number of voxels, respectively, in which exceedance
probability is >0.9 in support of each model, indicating that the corresponding
model provides a significantly better account for the neural activity in that
region. See also Figure S4.
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learningorder to address whether trial-by-trial changes in RT account
for the effects reported in our fMRI data, we includedRTs as a co-
variate that competed for experimental variance in an additional
fMRI analysis. After doing this, all of our main findings remain
intact (if anything, the p values improved marginally for our reli-
ability signals), suggesting that RT per se does not explain the
fMRI results.
DISCUSSION
We provide evidence for the existence in the human brain of an
arbitrator mechanism that determines the extent to which
model-based (goal-directed) and model-free (habitual) learning
systems control behavior. Specifically, this arbitrator keeps track
of the degree of reliability of the two systems and uses this infor-
mation in order to proportionately allocate behavioral control.
We found evidence to indicate that computational signals corre-
sponding to reliability for the two systems are present in a region
of ilPFC bilaterally, as well as a region of right medial FPC. In
particular, in the ilPFC, the individual reliability signals for the
two systems were present alongside the maximum reliability
(whichever signal out of the two systems was the most reliable),
while in the FPC, we found evidence for the maximum reliability
out of the two systems. We further found evidence for a com-
parison signal reflecting the difference in reliability between the
model-based and model-free signals in a region of rostral cingu-
late cortex. In order to further test whether the areas found toencode reliability are involved in interacting with neural systems
involved in encoding value signals within the two frameworks, we
demonstrated that effective connectivity between the arbitrator
regions and regions involved in encoding model-free values in
posterior putamen and supplementary motor cortex was signif-
icantly modulated as a function of the degree to which the arbi-
trator allocates behavioral control to the model-based system:
the more the arbitrator deems behavior should be controlled
by the model-based system, the greater the negative coupling
between the arbitrator regions and regions involved in model-
free valuation. Furthermore, the coupling between areas
involved in model-free valuation in the putamen and areas
involved in encoding integrated value signals in the vmPFC
was also modulated by the output of the arbitrator such that
the more control is allocated to the model-free system the
greater the coupling between those regions. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the mechanism by which
the arbitrator works is to modulate brain regions involved in
model-free valuation and to modulate the strength of connec-
tions between areas encoding model-free values and regions
involved in encoding an integrated value signal for the purpose
of guiding choice.
Valuation of Model-Based and Model-free Learning
System
Our task design also permitted us to clearly delineate brain
systems involved in model-based and model-free valuation.
Consistent with a number of prior reports, we found evidence
for model-based value signals in the vmPFC (Hampton et al.,
2006; Wunderlich et al., 2012). The finding of a role for vmPFC
in model-based inference is also consistent with evidence from
manipulations designed to isolate brain regions involved in
goal-directed control using techniques such as reinforcer deval-
uation and contingencymanipulations imported directly from the
animal literature (O’Doherty, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2008; Valentin
et al., 2007; de Wit et al., 2009). The additional finding that the
vmPFC also contains an integrated signal, incorporating a
weighted sumofmodel-based andmodel-free value signals pro-
portional to the degree of control allocated by the arbitrator, is
consistent with the possibility that the vmPFC is responsible
for integrating value signals across the two systems (Beierholm
et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012). Such an integrated signal
would be necessary for guiding unified choice behavior that re-
flects inputs from both model-based and model-free controllers.
We also found regions of posterior putamen, aswell as parts of
supplementary motor cortex, to contain model-free value sig-
nals. This finding is compatible with a previous report that value
signals in this area were prominent following an over-training
manipulation (Wunderlich et al., 2012), as well as a finding that
activity in this area is associated with increased habitual control
as manifested by insensitivity to reinforcer devaluation (Tricomi
et al., 2009). Furthermore, a recent DTI study found increased
connectivity between the posterior putamen and premotor
cortex in those individuals more susceptible to habitual control
in a slip-of-action task (de Wit et al., 2012). Collectively, these
findings support a relatively specific role for posterior parts of
the putamen in habit learning and further suggest that the contri-
butions of this region in habit learning can be well accounted forNeuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 693
Figure 6. Neural Correlates of Model-Based and Model-free Value Signals
QMB refers to the chosen value of the model-based system, and QMF refers to the chosen value of the model-free sysetm; the areas corresponding to QMBjMF
respond to chosen values commonly for both systems. QArb refers to the encoding of the chosen minus unchosen value signals, in which the value signals are a
weighted combination of model-based and model-free values determined by the output of the arbitrator (PMB). See also Figure S5 and Table S4.
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learningby a role for this region in encoding value signals prescribed by a
model-free reinforcement-learning algorithm.
Computations Involved in Arbitration between Two
Learning Systems
The arbitration mechanism implemented in the present study
used reliability measures about the two systems based on the
prediction-error signals generated by each model system.
SPEs within the model-based system were found to be located
in largely cortical systems, particularly a frontoparietal network
consistent with a previous report (Gla¨scher et al., 2010). To
compute reliability estimates within the model-based system,
we used a bottom-up Bayesian approach, which generates a
probability distribution over the hypothesis that SPEs are zero.
The ratio of the mean prediction (belief about the hypothesis)
and variance of the distribution produced the reliability estimate
used by the arbitrator in inferior prefrontal cortex. The notion that
the model-based system uses a computationally rich Bayesian
inference mechanism to generate reliability estimates is feasible
given that this system appears to depend on a large extent of
cortex to facilitate its implementation, including parts of parietal
cortex that have previously been hypothesized to implement
neural coding schemes consistent with Bayesian inference
(Beck et al., 2008).
On the other hand, RPEs within the model-free system were
found to be located subcortically in the striatum, both ventrally
and dorsally, consistent with a large prior literature (McClure
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004) implicating these regions in
RPE coding. Unlike the model-based system, where a Bayesian
mechanism was used to estimate reliability, in the model-free
system, behavior was best explained using a simpler reliability
estimate that essentially kept track of the average absolute value
of RPEs accumulated. As in the Bayesian estimator, the more694 Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.PEs that accumulated in the recent past, the lower the reliability
estimate. The use of an absolute PE signal to keep track of
reliability within the model-free system that can subsequently
be used by the arbitrator provides an alternative way to use an
unsigned PE signal, which is typically used to drive the rate of
learning or degree of associability ascribed to a cue (Pearce
and Hall, 1980; Roesch et al., 2010).
Arbitration Process Reflected by Functional
Connectivity
It is notable that while we find evidence for effective connectivity
between the inferior frontal and frontopolar arbitration regions
and areas involved in model-free valuation in the putamen and
supplementary motor cortex, we did not find any evidence for
direct interactions between the arbitrator and regions involved
in model-based valuation. These results imply an asymmetry in
how the arbitrator operates: instead of modulating either
model-based or model-free systems depending on which one
has the most reliable estimate, the controller appears to work
by selectively gating the model-free system. This could be
consistent with the possibility that perhaps model-free control
is in essence default behavior: unless the model-free controller
has especially poor predictions, all else being equal (and
due to reasons of computational efficiency), it is better for
behavior to be under model-free, as opposed to model-based,
control.
One possible interpretation of the present results is that the
lateral prefrontal cortex may exert inhibitory downregulation
on the value signals in the model-free system, although other
interpretations are possible given that PPI analyses cannot
permit direct measurement of ‘‘inhibition.’’ However, it is
notable that many previous findings have suggested a role
for ilPFC in inhibitory control and task switching more generally
A B
Figure 7. Neural Correlates of Value Integration
(A) Connectivity analyses between reliability regions in ilPFC and model-free value areas. The shaded circles represent seed regions from which physiological
signals were extracted, and colored blobs show the psychophysiological interaction effect. Shown are significant negative correlations between activity of the left
ilPFC and a region of posterior putamenmodulated by PMB (in orange), of the right ilPFC and the bilateral anterior putamen modulated by PMB (in green), and also
of the right FPC prefrontal cortex and the right posterior putamen modulated by PMB (in purple).
(B) Connectivity analyses between model-value areas and vmPFC area involved in encoding integrated value signal. Shown in cyan color is the negative
modulation of posterior putamen activity on vmPFC activity by PMB. All images are shown thresholded at p < 0.001 for display purposes. See also Figure S5 and
Table S5.
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2008). It is likely that in many previous studies in which activity
is reported in these regions during task switching as well as
pertaining to situations where inhibitory control is required,
such tasks are tapping into interactions between goal-directed
and habitual controllers. For instance, in reversal learning, the
switching of response selection from a previously rewarded
S-R contingency to a new response likely involves the need
to wrest control from a previously learned S-R habit to a new
goal-directed action (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
2003; Xue et al., 2008). In such previous studies, it was not
possible to determine precisely what computations in inferior
prefrontal cortex are facilitating such a switch in control (and
inhibition of a prepotent response set).
The present findings may relate to some findings in the animal
literature. In the rodent brain, infralimbic cortex, a part of the rat
prefrontal cortex, has previously been implicated in modulating
habitual control (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003; Smith et al.,
2012). It is unclear to what extent the areas identified in the pre-
sent study in humans relate to that infralimbic region in the ro-
dent. We did find a region of medial frontal cortex putatively
involved in the comparison of reliabilities between the two sys-
tems in the rostral cingulate cortex (which could be a candidate
homolog). However, the type of arbitration found in inferior pre-
frontal cortex, and FPC in the present study appears not to
correspond directly to the functions ascribed to the infralimbic
cortex in the rodent brain. Nevertheless, there is some com-
monality between the findings of the present study and those
rodent studies in that in both cases we find a key role for pre-
frontal cortex in mediating the degree of habitual control ex-
pressed over behavior. Intriguingly, a recent study in rodents
(Burguie`re et al., 2013) also appears to support the notion of
an inhibitory mechanism involving parts of lateral prefrontal cor-
tex in the rodent operating on the striatum, which is potentially
related to what we find in our data, although that particular ro-
dent study did not address the distinction between model-
based versus model-free control.Control between Multiple Learning Systems in Lateral
Prefrontal and FPC
Our evidence additionally implicating the FPC in the arbitration
process is also compatible with previous proposals that FPC
sits at the apex of a hierarchical prefrontal organization for
cognitive control (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007). While we found
that both the FPC and inferior prefrontal cortex contained esti-
mates about the maximum reliability out of the two systems,
only the inferior prefrontal cortex contained individual reliabil-
ities for the two controllers. It is possible that FPC and inferior
prefrontal cortex play different roles in implementing the arbitra-
tion process, and given the putative locus of FPC at the top of
the frontal hierarchy, it is tempting to speculate that this region
might supervise the inhibitory control being implemented by a
subservient inferior prefrontal cortex. However, further work
will be needed to establish whether this is indeed the case.
Our findings implicating FPC in reliability competition gener-
alize previous findings about a role for this region in relative
uncertainty processing in rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (Badre
et al., 2012) and a role for this region in encoding relative
unchosen action probabilities (Boorman et al., 2009). The
computation of our reliability competition might accommodate
both of these findings, because the preferred and alterna-
tive strategy should be integrated and because it needs to be
done on the basis of the estimation of the posterior uncertainty.
The inferior lateral and frontopolar areas in which we found
reliability signals are also close to the region of right lateral
prefrontal cortex found to process subjective confidence
(DeMartino et al., 2013) and the region of lateral anterior prefron-
tal cortex previously implicated in metacognitive processes
(Baird et al., 2013), respectively. One possibility emerging from
these findings is that anterior lateral and polar prefrontal cortices
may serve a general role in computing estimates about the
reliability of different control strategies. This interpretation might
serve to unify a number of findings about the role of lateral and
frontopolar cortices in metacognition by suggesting that the
activity of this region reflects the operation of higher-level nodesNeuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 695
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Arbitration of Model-Based and Model-free Learningin a processing hierarchy. Reliability computations about model-
based and model-free control may be only one out of a number
of different types of computation subserved by these brain
areas. It is important to note that it is entirely feasible that other
variables apart from reliability will feed into the arbitration pro-
cess, such as the time available to render a decision, or the
amount of available cognitive resources at a given point in
time. Further work will need to establish how such other consid-
erations get incorporated into the arbitration process, as well as
to determine which brain regions contribute to those aspects of
the arbitration.
The arbitration framework also accounts for both competitive
and cooperative effects between model-based and model-free
learning in a broader sense. The arbitration mechanism un-
dergoes competition on each choice (model based versusmodel
free) while fostering collaboration during the transition over trials
(model-based/model-free or model-free/model-based). The
competition corresponds to the reliability computation, whereas
the collaboration corresponds to the dynamics of arbitration
(PMB). The RPEs that themodel-free system experiences in these
trials are the consequence of the choices that are based on the
mixture of the model-based and the model-free value. This inter-
pretation is supported by recent studies finding that model-
based control can influence model-free learning (Daw et al.,
2011; Staudinger and Bu¨chel, 2013). In future work, it would be
valuable to formally test the framework outlined here in a unified
dynamic causal model of the arbitration process involving the
brain areas implicated here on the basis of the computational
fMRI and PPI analyses.
In summary, the present findings indicate how it is that the
brain switches control between two very different strategies for
controlling behavior. These findings open the possibility for
investigating the role of impaired arbitration mechanisms in
driving addictive behavior or psychiatric disorders involving the
overdominance of habitual control, such as OCD (Gillan et al.,
2011), as well as opening avenues to potential novel treatments
for such disorders involving pharmacological or electromagnetic
modulation of neural activity in the inferior lateral or polar
prefrontal cortices.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty-two right-handed volunteers (six females with a mean age of 28, with
age ranging from 19 to 40) participated in the study. They were screened
prior to the experiment to exclude those with a history of neurological or psy-
chiatric illness. All subjects gave informed consent, and the study was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of
Technology.
Stimuli
The image set for the stimuli consisted of 126 fractal images, four kinds of
collection box images (red, yellow, blue, and white), three kinds of color coins
(red, yellow, and blue), and an extra four fractal images to represent outcome
states. The colors of the outcome state image were accompanied by numer-
ical amounts that indicate the amount of money that subjects could receive
in that state. Before the experiment began, the stimulus computer randomly
chose five fractal images that were subsequently used to represent each state,
and the amount of money available in each state (40, 20, or 10 cents USD) was
randomly assigned to each color coin across subjects.696 Neuron 81, 687–699, February 5, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.Task
Participants performed a sequential two-choice Markov decision task, in
which they need to make two sequential choices (by pressing ‘‘LEFT’’ or
‘‘RIGHT’’ button) to obtain a monetary outcome (coin) at the end stage. Mak-
ing no choice in 4 s had a computer make a random choice to proceed, and
that trial was marked as a penalizing trial. In each trial, participants begin at
the same starting state. The two choices will be followed by a coin delivery.
The states were intersected by a variable temporal interval drawn from a uni-
form distribution between 1 to 4 s. The intertrial interval was also sampled
from a uniform distribution between 1 to 4 s. The reward was displayed for
2 s. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were informed that they
need to learn about the states and corresponding outcomes to collect as
many coins as possible and that they will get to keep the money they cumu-
latively earned at the end of the experiment. Participants were not informed
about the specific state-transition probabilities used in the task, except they
were told that the contingencies might change during the course of the exper-
iment. In the pretraining session, they were given the opportunity to learn
about the task, while they were free to make any choice. The state-transition
probability was fixed at (0.5, 0.5), and a white collection box was presented
during this session indicating that any token color would yield monetary
reward (see below). The subjects performed 100 trials in this pretraining ses-
sion, which would allow them to spend enough time to learn; we learned from
our previous study that 80 trials would be enough for subjects to learn about a
two-choice Markov decision task (Gla¨scher et al., 2010). The experiment pro-
ceeded in five separate scanning sessions of 80 trials each on average.
Our experimental design incorporated two conditions: a specific-goal
condition and an outcome general condition. In the specific-goal condition,
participants were presented with a specific color collection box (e.g., either
red, yellow, blue, or gray) that indicated the color of the specific token that
was valuable on that trial. If the state associated with that token was
reached, then participants would gain the specific monetary amount associ-
ated with that token. If on the other hand, a different colored end state was
reached, then no money would be obtained. The specific goal-state that was
valued was changed randomly from trial-to-trial. Thus, participants had to
continually consider which goal is currently valuable in order to make a
choice. This condition was designed to favor model-based as opposed to
model-free control. Conversely, in the flexible-goal condition, a white collec-
tion box was presented that indicated that any color of end state could be
reached in order to yield monetary outcomes. While this condition also could
involve model-based computations, simulations demonstrated that after a
number of trials control might transition to the model-free system (Fig-
ure S1C). Hence, these two conditions were designed to favor model-based
versus model-free control, respectively (Figure S2). To further dissociate the
model-based from the model-free control and to prevent participants from
using multiple model-free strategies in the absence of the model-based con-
trol in the specific-goal condition, changes to the transition probabilities were
implemented in both conditions. Two types of state-transition probability
were used—(0.9, 0.1) and (0.5, 0.5). They are the probabilities that the choice
is followed by going into the two consecutive states. For example, if you
make a left choice at state 1 when the state transition probability is
(0.9, 0.1), then the probability of your next state being state 2 is 0.9, and
the probability for state 3 is 0.1. The order of the block conditions was ran-
domized. Thus, the conditions are as follows: (i) specific-goal, state-transi-
tion probability (0.9, 0.1); (ii) specific-goal, state-transition probability
(0.5, 0.5); (iii) flexible-goal, state-transition probability (0.9, 0.1); and (iv) flex-
ible-goal, state-transition probability (0.5, 0.5). The blocks with the state tran-
sition probability (0.9, 0.1) consist of three to five trials, whereas those with
(0.5, 0.5) consist of five to seven trials due to the difficulty in learning under
high uncertainty. When determining the minimum length of trials and the
state-transition probability values, we ensured that the estimation process
of the state-transition probability of the model-based learner does not break
down; also, the two transition probabilities are distinctive enough that with
(0.9, 0.1) participants feel that the state transition is congruent with the
choice, whereas with (0.5, 0.5) the state transition is random. At the begin-
ning of each trial, participants can immediately recognize the specific/flexible
goal condition by seeing the color of the collection box, but they performed
the task without knowing the state-transition probability.
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to induce perturbations in the predictions about state-transition probabilities,
which in turn affect changes in the allocation of model-based and model-free
control. We do not expect participants to fully learn these different transition
probabilities in the small number of trials before a shift occurs: all that matters
is that a change in the reliability of the predictions occurs following such
changes. The changes occur at these rates in order to ensure that tonically
varying changes in model-based versus model-free control (i.e., PMB in our
model) can be detected at experimental frequencies appropriate for fMRI
data. Slower-varying changes in transition probabilities might have produced
changes in control at frequencies aliased with the well-known characteristics
of low-frequency noise inherent in fMRI data.
Computational Model of Arbitration
First, in order to capture model-free learning we used a model-free SARSA
learner, a variant of a classical reinforcement learning model (Sutton and
Barto, 1998) (the first row of Figure 2). We also implemented a model-based
learner, which is equipped with FORWARD learning (following our previous
study [Gla¨scher et al., 2010]) and BACKWARD planning (the first row of Fig-
ure 2). Second, we implemented a simple hierarchical empirical Bayes
approach to compute the reliability of a learning strategy given the history of
the PE (the second row of Figure 2). PE refers to SPE for the case of model-
based and RPE for the case of model free. A push-pull mechanism was
then implemented to govern how the reliability-based competition between
model-based and model free mediates value computation (the third row of
Figure 2). Finally, the arbitration model selects actions stochastically accord-
ing to the following softmax function (Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Luce, 1959) (the
fourth row of Figure 2). Full details of the model description, parameter estima-
tion, and model comparison are provided in Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Functional imaging was performed on a 3T Siemens (Erlangen) Trio scanner
located at the Caltech Brain Imaging Center (Pasadena) with a 32-channel
radio frequency coil for all the MR scanning sessions. To reduce the possibility
of head-movement-related artifact, participants’ heads were securely posi-
tioned with foam position pillows. High-resolution structural images were
collected using a standard MPRAGE pulse sequence, providing full brain
coverage at a resolution of 1 mm 3 1 mm 3 1 mm. Functional images were
collected at an angle of 30 from the anterior commissure-posterior commis-
sure axis, which reduced signal dropout in the orbitofrontal cortex. Forty-five
slices were acquired at a resolution of 3 mm 3 3 mm 3 3 mm, providing
whole-brain coverage. A one-shot echo-planar imaging pulse sequence was
used (TR = 2800 ms; TE = 30 ms; FOV = 100 mm; flip angle = 80).
fMRI Data Analysis
The SPM8 software package was used to analyze the fMRI data (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London). The
first four volumes of images were discarded to avoid T1 equilibrium effects.
Slice-timing correction was applied to the functional images to adjust for the
fact that different slices within each image were acquired at slightly different
points in time. Images were corrected for participant motion, spatially trans-
formed to match a standard echo-planar imaging template brain, and
smoothed using a 3DGaussian kernel (6mmFWHM) to account for anatomical
differences between participants. This set of data was then analyzed statisti-
cally. A high-pass filter with a cutoff at 129 s was used. Full details of the
general linear model (GLM) design are provided in Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
Whole-Brain Analyses
Essentially all of the findings we report survive after the whole-brain correction
for multiple comparison at the cluster level (p < 0.05 corrected), except for the
value signals, some of which are reported using a well-motivated SVC correc-
tion. Full details are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
To avoid nonindependence bias in plotting parameter estimates of the
reliability, we ran leave-one-subject-out GLM analysis (Esterman et al.,
2010). Specifically, we ran 22 GLMs with one subject left out in each, andeach GLM defines the voxel cluster for the subject left out. The percent signal
change (rfxplot toolbox available at http://rfxplot.sourceforge.net/), illustrating
how much the evoked BOLD response deviates from its voxel-wise baseline,
was then computed across 22 subjects.
To formally test which version of the reliability computation provides the best
account of responses in ilPFC, we ran a Bayesian model selection (Stephan
et al., 2009) on three models. We chose three models—mixedArb-dynamics
and dualBayesArb-dynamics, which showed the best and the second-best
performance in terms of the trade-off between model fit and model complexity
for the behavioral data, respectively, and for comparison with an arbitration
scheme proposed in prior literature we tested Daw et al.’s version of reliability
computation (UncBayesArb) (Daw et al., 2005) in which the computation of
reliability is based on the uncertainty in the state-action value.Post Hoc PPI Analysis
To test whether there is a functional coupling between the areas associated
with value signals and the area serving as a value comparator during choices,
we performed a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al.,
1997) with the probability of choosing the model-based learning strategy
(PMB) being a parametric psychological factor. We used the first eigenvariate
of BOLD signals from the left and the right ilPFC extracted from a 5mm sphere
centered at (54, 38, 3) and (48, 35,2), respectively, areas identified as corre-
lating with model-based and model-free reliability. Because we found signifi-
cant negatively correlating PPIs using the reliability areas as our seed regions
and PMB as the psychological variable with brain regions shown to be corre-
lated with model-free but not model-based valuation, we next performed addi-
tional PPI analyses using areas involved in encoding model-free values as our
seeds: supplementary motor area (9, 8, 55), and posterior putamen (27,4,
1) (all 5 mm spheres). In each of these analyses we formed an interaction term,
which is the first eigenvariate of the BOLD signal multiplied by the parametric
psychological variable—the PMB. To avoid identifying regions in which most
of the variance is accounted for by main effects, as opposed to being ac-
counted by interaction effect, we included the psychological and physiological
term fromwhich we derived the interaction term in the GLM as covariates of no
interest, followed by the interaction term as a repressors of interest.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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